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Abstract. In this paper we present a dynamic assignment language which extends the dy-
namic predicate logic of Groenendijk and Stokhof [1991: 39-100) with i assignment and with 
generalized quantifiers. The use of this dynamic assignment language for natural language 
analysis, along the lines of o.c. and [Barwise, 1987: 1-29], is demonstrated by examples. We 
show that our representation language permits us to treat a wide variety of 'donkey sentences': 
conditionals with a donkey pronoun in their consequent and quantified sentences with donkey 
pronouns anywhere in the scope of the quantifier. It is also demonstrated that our account does 
not suffer from the so-called proportion problem. 
Discussions about the correctness or incorrectness of proposals for dynamic interpretation 
oflanguage have been hampered in the past by the difficulty of seeing through the ramifications 
of the dynamic semantic clauses (phrased in terms of input-output behaviour) in non-trivial 
cases. To remedy this, we supplement the dynamic semantics of our representation language 
with an axiom system in the style of Hoare. While the representation languages ofBarwise and 
Groenendijk and Stokhof were not ax.iomatized, the rules we propose form a deduction system 
for the dynamic assignment language which is proved correct and complete with respect to the 
semantics. 
Finally, we define the static meaning of a program 7f of the dynamic assignment language 
as the weakest condition 'P such that 7T terminates successfully on all states satisfying tp, and 
we show that our calculus gives a straightforward method for finding static meanings of the 
programs of the representation language. 
Key words: semantics of natural language, dynamic interpretation, Hoare logic, knowledge 
representation languages. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Our starting point is a dynamic perspective on natural language as proposed 
in [Barwise, 1987: 1-29] and [Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991: 39-100]. We 
propose to supplement the purely semantic treatment that was given in those 
papers with a syntactic account, using the tools of Hoare logic. 
The key notions to be introduced and discussed in this paper are briefly 
summarized in the following table. Hopefully the table does provide some 
guidance through the pages that follow. 
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1f syntax of dynamic assignment language §3 
[rr].M interpretation of program 11 w.r.t. model M §4 
[Qx(rr1, 7r2)]M interpretation of quantified programs §5,6 
MI= cp [A] valuation A satisfies formula ip in model M §7 
K I= (cp) rr (?/;) existential correctness assertion valid in class K §7 
Ki={'P}11{7);} universal correctness assertion valid in class K §7 
K I- (cp) 7r (?/;) existential correctness assertion derivable for K §7 
Kl-{ip}rr{1/J} universal correctness assertion derivable for K §7 
If K I- F then JC f= F soundness of the Hoare calculus §8 
If K f= F then K I- F completeness of the Hoare calculus §9 
2. THE DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON NATURAL LANGUAGE 
For a quick review of the virtues of a dynamic perspective on natural language 
interpretation, consider mini discourse (1), where the hearer is asked to take 
two different individuals in mind. 
A man walked in. He sat down. Another man walked in. (1) 
Suppose we intend the reading where he is anaphorically linked to the earlier 
indefinite and another is anaphorically constrained (to borrow a term from 
Barwise, o.c.) by that same indefinite. We follow Barwise in using superscript 
indices for antecedents and subscripts for anaphors, to indicate the intention. 
A man1 walked in. He1 sat down. Another1 man2 walked in. (2) 
What intuitively happens when discourse (2) is processed can be described 
as follows. First one (i.e., the processor) is invited to focus on an arbitrary 
man. Then one is asked to consider a choice of man where that man walked 
in. Furthennore one is asked to focus on a choice of man where that man sat 
down as well. Next one is assumed to keep this choice of man in mind, and 
again to pick a reference to an arbitrary man, but in such a way that that man 
is different from the first man. Finally one is to consider a second choice of 
man where that second man walked in. 
This account sounds like a piece of imperative programming, which sug-
gests that its meaning can be given in terms of a translation into a programming 
language. Here is such a translation (tense is ignored), in a language which 
has the same expressive power as the dynamic predicate logic of Groenendijk 
and Stokhof [1991: 39-100], but which reveals its imperative programming 
nature a bit more clearly. 
17v1 : man v1; walk-in v1; sit-down v1; 
17v2: (i12 i= v1; man v2); walk-in vz. 
(3) 
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The programming language employed in (3) has two kinds of basic statements: 
assignments and tests. 'TJX : n is a command to assign an arbitrary individual 
to x that fulfils requirement 7r. R(t1 · · · tn) is a test which succeeds on a 
given input variable state if the values of the terms t1 through tn fulfil the 
condition specified by the relation symbol R, and fails otherwise. Sequences 
of statements are formed with the sequencing operator ;. The assignments are 
non-deterministic, which means that semantically a program is not a function 
from states to states, but a relation between states (or equivalently, a function 
from states to sets of states). Test statements narrow down the set of output 
states. A test relates an input state that satisfies it to itself, and an input state 
that does not satisfy it to nothing at all. 
We will fix the meaning for this assign-and-test mini-language by giving 
a (dynamic) semantics for it. Next, we specify a set of Hoare style rules for 
it, by way of axiom system. The advantage of doing both of these things 
is that the Hoare style rules provide a link to notions of static semantics, 
thus allowing us to take snapshots of truth conditions at various stages in 
the discourse processing, so to speak. Stated otherwise, the Hoare style rules 
allow us to consider projections from dynamic logic to static logic, in the 
sense of [Van Benthem, 1990]. 
3. DYNAMIC ASSIGNMENT LOGIC: 
SYNTAX AND INFORMAL SEMANTICS 
This section is meant as an introduction to dynamic predicate logic in its 
undisguised form as an imperative programming language. The ingredients 
to be introduced here are atomic tests, sequential program composition, indef-
inite and definite assignments, program implication and program negation. 
Later on we will add generalized quantifiers. We call the language we are 
about to present DAL (Dynamic Assignment Logic). 
In natural language, one does not engage in explicitly bookkeeping with 
regard to the 'slots' used for keeping track of individuals mentioned in dis-
course. One just keeps them in mind, and does not confuse them, that is all. 
To make sure that in DAL the slots do not get confused, one might stipulate 
that new assignments to variables which are already 'active' are forbidden. 
We will not impose this constraint on the general framework, but we will 
define a sublanguage of DAL programs where the constraint is imposed. 
We first define the set of programs of DAL and the set av of assignment 
variables of a DAL program. For simplicity's sake we take the terms of DAL 
to be a set of individual variables V (one might want to add constants and 
deictic parameters to this, but we will not do so here). 
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Given a set of terms and a set of relation symbols, the set of DAL programs 
is the smallest set such that the following hold. 
1. ..L is a program. 
2. If t 1, t1 are terms, then t 1 = t1 is a program. 
3. If Ris an n-place relation symbol and t1, ... , tn are terms, then R(t1 · · · tn) 
is a program. 
4. If 7f1 and 7f2 are programs then (7r1; 7r2) is a program. 
5. If 7fJ and 7f2 are programs then (1ri => 7r2) is a program. 
6. If 7f is a program, then -i7f is a program. 
7. If 7f is a program and x is a variable, then 'f/X : 7f is a program. 
8. If 7f is a program and x is a variable, then ix : 7f is a program. 
Here is the definition of the set av( 7f) of assignment variables of a program 
7f. 
1. av(..L) = 0. 
2. av(t1 = t1) = 0. 
3. av(R(t1 · · · tn)) = 0. 
4. av( ( rr1; 7rz)) = av( 7f1) U av( 7r2). 
5. av((7r1 => 7r2)) = 0. 
6. av(-i7f) = 0. 
7. av(7)x: 7r) = {x} U av(7r). 
8. av(ix: 7r) = {x} U av(7r). 
Next we define the sublanguage of DAL programs (call it DALo), where no 
new values get assigned to 'active' variables. Here we need simultaneous 
recursion on 7f and a v( 7f). It is the smallest set such that the following hold. 
1 . ..Lis a program with av( ..L) = 0. 
2. If ti, t1 are terms, then t1 = t2 is a program with av(t1 = t2) = 0. 
3. If Risan n-place relationsymboland ti, ... , tn are terms, then R(t1 · · · tn) 
is a program with av(R(t1 · · · tn)) = 0. 
4. If 7fJ and 7f2 are programs with av( 1fl) n av( 7r2) = 0 then ( 7fl; 7r2) is a 
program with av((7r1; rr2)) = av(7r1) U av(7r2). 
5. If rr1 and rr2 are programs with av( 7fI) n av( 7r2) = 0 then ( 7fI => rr2) is a 
program with av((7r1 => 7r2)) = 0. 
6. If 7f is a program, then -i7f is a program with av(-i1f) = 0. 
7. If 7f is a program and x is a variable with x ~ av( 7f) then 1)X : 7f is a 
program with av(7)x: 7r) = {x} U av(7r). 
8. If 7f is a program and x is a variable with x ~ av(7r) then ix : 7f is a 
program withav(ix: 7r) = {x} Uav(7r). 
We will follow the usual predicate logical convention of omitting outermost 
parentheses for readability. Also, it will become evident from the semantic 
clause for sequential composition that the ; operator is associative. Therefore, 
we will often take the liberty to write 1fJ; 7r2; 7f3 instead of ( 1fl; 7f2); 7f3 or 
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7fJ; ( 7r2; 7r3 ). Also, t1 =I= t2 will be used to abbreviate •t1 = t2 (cf. example 
(3)). Finally, we use T as an abbreviation for ---.J_. 
The restrictions on assignment variables will for example rule out (4) as a 
program of DALo (though not of DAL). 
71v1 : man vi; 17111 : boy 111. (4) 
The remainder of this section is devoted to an infonnal account of the 
semantics of atomic test predicates, implication, negation and union of DAL 
programs, and 77 and l assignment. Section 4 will give the formal semantics. 
Semantically, what we are interested in is states, functions from the set of 
DAL variables to individuals in a model. Semantically, DAL programs act as 
state transformers: a DAL program takes an input state and either indicates 
success by producing an output state or it indicates failure by not producing 
anything at all. Equivalently, we can view the meaning of a program as 
a function mapping any input state to the set of all possible outputs the 
program can produce for that input. A program which is a test will on input 
A either produce output set {A} (in case the test succeeds) or output set 0 
(in case the test fails). Programs which may produce non-singleton sets are 
non-deterministic; for some inputs there is more than one possible output 
state. Examples of non-detenninistic programs are 71 assignment programs; 
the program 1p: : 7f has, on input A, the set of all states which may differ from 
A in the fact that they have another x value, namely some value that satisfies 
7f. 
The program J_ expresses a test which always fails; it is meant to express 
the same as if true then fail else skip fi. In other words: for every input state 
A, J_ will produce output state 0. As was mentioned above, we use T as an 
abbreviation for ---.J_. The program T is a test which always succeeds; in other 
words, it is meant to express the same as the ALGOL style statement if true 
then skip else fail fi. In other words, for every input state A, T will produce 
output set {A}. Atomic predicates like t1 = t2 or R( t1 · · · tn) are meant to 
express tests which may fail; in ALGOL style notation: if R( t1 · · • tn) then 
skip else fail fi. Again in terms of input output behaviour: If R(t1 • • • tn) 
evaluates to true in state A, the predicate will have output set {A}, otherwise 
the output set will be 0. 
Programs of the form (1ri :::::} 7r2) are intended to treat the interplay of 
natural language implication and descriptions, as in the following examples. 
If a gir/1 has a boyfriend2 , she 1 teases him2 . (5) 
If a man 1 admires the king2, he1 cheers him2• (6) 
Example (5) has the following DAL translation. 
( rru1 : girl 111; 77v2 : boyfriend v2; has( v1, v2)) :::::} teases( v1, v2). (7) 
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To get the semantics right, one has to assume that (7) is true if and only if 
every output state for the antecedent (8) will be an appropriate input state for 
the consequent (9). 
77v1 : girl vi; 77v2 : boyfriend v2; has( vi, v2). 
teases(v1,v2). 
(8) 
(9) 
Negation should allow one to treat examples like the following, where the 
negation has scope over an indefinite. 
The manager1 does not use a PC2. 
This example can be translated into DAL as follows: 
w1 : (manager v1); •(r7v2: pc v2; use(v1, v2)). 
(10) 
(l l) 
To get the semantics right, a negated program should act as a test: •7r should 
accept (without change) all variable states which cannot serve as input for 7r, 
and reject all others. In fact, it will tum out that •7r is definable in terms of 
:::::} and l_, as 7r :::::} 1-. 
Definite descriptions can act as anaphors and antecedents at the same time. 
Discourse (12) provides an example. 
A customer1 entered. The womanj sat down. Shez smiled. (12) 
The indices indicate that the woman has a customer as its antecedent, while 
at the same time acting itself as antecedent for she in the next sentence (and 
constraining the gender of the pronoun). A DAL translation of (12) is given 
in (13). 
r7v1 : customer VJ; enter VJ; (13) 
wz : ( vz =VJ; woman vz); sit-down vz; smile vi. 
The i assignment in (13) is dependent on the 7J assignment to variable v1. 
With reference to a particular assignment for VJ, the description is unique. 
Note that the i assignment to v2 does indirectly act as a test on the previous 7J 
assignment to VJ: this test will weed out 7J assignments that are inappropriate 
in the light of the subsequent discourse. 
Definite descriptions can also be dependent on each other. Consider the 
string of characters in (14). 
(14) 
Suppose just for an instant that (14) is a state of affairs one is talking about. 
The state of affairs involves characters and hat symbols (hats for short). With 
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reference to (14), it does make sense to talk about the character with the hat, 
although (14) neither has a unique character nor a unique hat. We can, for 
instance, truthfully assert (15) about (14). 
The character with the hat is a capital. (15) 
The translation into DAL is straightforward: 
w1: (characterv1; w2: (hatv2; with(v1,v2))); capitalv1. (16) 
Intuitively, the first i assignment 'tries out' individual characters C until it 
finds the unique C with the property that a unique hat H for C can be found. 
The semantic picture sketched above is still in need of an extra touch. 
Nothing we have said so far makes clear how the dynamic treatment of 
definite descriptions is meant to deal with their uniqueness presuppositions. 
This topic will not be dealt with in this paper (but see [Van Eijck, 1991]). 
4. SEMANTICS: FORMAL DEFINITIONS 
Assume a model M = (U, I), with U a universe of individuals and I an 
interpretation function for the first order relation symbols of the language. 
We consider the set S of all functions A : V -> U. This is the set of states for 
M. 
A state A for M = (U, I) determines a valuation VA for the terms of the 
language as follows: if t E V then VA ( t) = A ( t) (as we take all our terms to 
be variables, this is all there is to the definition of VA). If A is a state for M, 
x a variable and d an element of the universe or M, then A[x := d] is the 
state for M which is just like A except for the possible difference that x is 
mapped to d. 
We define a function [7r]M : s -> Ps by recursion. A, B, C are used 
as metavariables over states. The function [7r]M depends on the model M, 
but for convenience we will often write [7r] rather than [7r ]M· The function 
should be read as: on input state A, 7r may produce any of the outputs in 
output state set [7r](A). 
1. [_i](A) = 0. 
2. [R(t ···t )](A)= {{A} if (VA\t1), ... ,VA(tn)) E l(R) 
l n 0 otherwise. 
3. [t = t ] (A) = { {A} if VA ( t_1 ) = VA ( t2) 
1 2 0 otherwise. 
4. [(7r1; 7r2)](A) = U{[7r2](B) I B E [7r1](A)}. 
5_ [(7r * 7r )](A)= {{A} if BE_ [7ri](A) implies [n2](B) # 0 
1 2 0 otherwise. 
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6. [•7r](A) ={{A} if [7r](.A) = 0 0 othe1W1se. 
7. [r1x : 7rHA) = U{[7r](A[x := d]) I d E U}. 
{
[7r](A[x := d]) fortheunique d EU 
8. [ix: 7r](A) = for which [7r](A[x := d]) i= 0 if such d exists 
0 otherwise. 
Truth is defined in tenns of input-output behaviour: 7r is true relative to 
model M if there are states A, B for M such that B E [7r]M(A). Two 
programs 'ffJ, 7r2 are equivalent if for every model M and every state A for 
M, [7r1]M(A) = [7r2]M(A). 
Dynamic consequence is defined as follows: 7rI f= 7r2 if for every model 
M and for all states A, B for M: if B E [7rI]M(A) then there is a state 
C with C E [7r2]M(B). This choice has a straightfoIWard motivation. The 
consequence relation mirrors the behaviour of::} at meta level, so we get the 
following equivalence for free. 
(17) 
The various other possible consequence relations for dynamic logic will not 
concern us in this paper. 
The statement 71x : 7r performs a non-deterministic action, for it sanctions 
any assignment to x of an individual satisfying 7r. The statement acts as a test 
at the same time: in case there are no individuals satisfying 7r the set of output 
states for any given input state will be empty. In fact, the meaning of 71x : 7r 
can be thought of as a random assignment followed by a test, for ryx : 7r is 
equivalent to 71x : T; 'ff, or in more standard notation, x := ?; 11'. It follows 
immediately from this explanation plus the dynamic meaning of sequential 
composition that ryx : ( 'ffJ ); 7r2 is equivalent with TJX : ( 7rI; 7r2). 
The interpretation conditions for i assignment make clear how the unique-
ness condition is handled dynamically. The statement iX : 7r consists of a test 
followed by a deterministic action in case the test succeeds: first it is checked 
whether there is a unique 'ff; if so, this individual is assigned to x; otheIWise 
the program fails (in other words, the set of output states is empty). Thus we 
see that the two programs ix : ( 7rI ); 7r2 and tx : ( 7rI; 7r2) are not equivalent. 
The program ix : ( 'ffJ; 7r2 ) succeeds if there is a unique object d satisfying 
7r1; 7r2, while the requirement for ix : ( 7fI ); 7r2 is stronger: there has to be a 
unique individual d satisfying 7rI, and d must also satisfy rr2. 
The clause for dynamic implication should take care of the proper treat-
ment of the description his wife in example (18). 
If the president is married then his wife will be cross with him. ( 18) 
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To indicate the reading where the possessive pronoun his is anaphorically 
linked to the president, we again use indices. The intended reading of (18) is 
indicated by the following indexing. 
If the president1 is married then 
[his1 wifeP will be cross with him1• 
A suitable translation is the following: 
( iv1 : president v1; married v1) => 
(iv2: wife-of(vi,v1); cross-with(v2,v1)). 
(19) 
(20) 
Assuming that the president has unique reference, we can say the following. 
Either the subprogram for The president is married will not complete suc-
cessfully, and then program (20) succeeds, or there will be a unique referent 
for 1, assignment in the subprogram for the consequent, and the subprogram 
for his wife will be cross with him will succeed, provided that the unique 
referent for v2 satisfies cross-with( v2, v1 ). 
5. ADDING QUANTIFIERS 
Adding quantifiers to DAL is relatively straightforward. For convenience, 
we restrict attention to binary quantifiers. Let Q1, Q2 , ... be a list of binary 
quantifier symbols. Assume that the interpretation functions of the models 
M = (TJ, 'I) are extended with suitable interpretations for these. That is to 
say, for every Qi, I( Qi) is a binary quantifier relation on P( D), i.e. a relation 
satisfying the constraints of extension, isomorphy and conservativity (see for 
example [Westerst.Ahl, 1989: 1-131]). 
A quantifier relation R is conservative (or: lives on its first argument) if 
R(A, B) iff R(A, An B).A quantifier relation satisfies extension if adding 
or deleting individuals from the part of the universe which is outside the 
extension of the arguments does not affect the relation, i.e., if the relation 
satisfies RE(A, B) iff RE1(A, B), for all E, E' with E, E' 2 AU B. 
Because of our reliance on conservativity, the analysis provided in this 
section does not work without further ado for a quantifier like only, as in Only 
men are chauvinists. This problem will be addressed in Section 6. 
First we extend the syntax of DAL. The set of DAL programs is the smallest 
set satisfying the following clauses. 
1. - 8. As above, in the definition of DAL. 
9. If 11'! and n2 are programs and Q is a quantifier, then Qx( n 1, rr2 ) is a 
program. 
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For the time being we do not take external dynamic effects of quantifiers 
into account, i.e. we take our quantifiers to be only internally dynamic. This 
transpires in the definition of the set of assignment variables of a quantified 
program. 
1. - 8. As above. 
9. av(Qx(1ri,7r2)) = 0. 
As for the extended version of DALo, the set of DALo programs is the smallest 
set satisfying the following clauses. 
1. - 8. As above, in the definition of DALo. 
9. If 7rJ and 71"2 are programs with x ~ av(7r1), x ~ av(7r2) and av(7r1) n 
av(7r2) = 0, and Q is a quantifier, then Qx(7r1,7r2) is a program with 
av(Qx(7r1,7r2)) = 0. 
Here is the intended semantics. 
1. - 8. As above. {A} if 
( { d E U I [7r1](A[x := d]) -=/- 0}, 
9. [Qx(7r1, 7r2H(A) = {d EU I [7r1; 7r2](A[x := d])-=/- 0}) 
0 otherwise. 
E I(Q) 
The semantic clause makes clear that quantifiers, as defined here, do not have 
an external dynamic effect. Externally, they acts as tests: in case the test 
succeeds the set of output states has the input state as its only member. The 
internal dynamic effect of a quantifier does interact with the external dynamic 
effects of definites and indefinites, however. 
To see how the semantics of quantification works in the simplest possible 
case, let us walk through example program (21). 
Qx(Sx,Tx). (21) 
According to the semantic clause, on input state A this program gives {A} 
iff the sets (22) and (23) are in the relation I( Q). 
{d EU I [Sx](A[.-z; := d]) -=f. 0}. 
{d EU I [Sx; Tx](A[x := d]) -=f. 0}. 
(22) 
(23) 
According to the semantic clause for atomic tests and the definition of the 
valuation function for terms, the set (22) can be rewritten as (24). 
{ d E u I d E I(S)}. (24) 
In the same way, and using the semantic clause for ; , the set (23) can be 
rewritten as (25). 
{ d E U I x E I(S) and x E J(T)}. (25) 
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Because the Q is assumed to denote a conservative quantifier with first argu-
ment as given by (24), (25) can be replaced by (26). 
{dEUlxEI(T)}. (26) 
Thus we find that (21) is true iff the sets given in (24) and (26) are in the 
relation denoted by the quantifier. This is the expected result. 
Dynamic effects will start to play a role if one or both of the argument pro-
grams of a quantified program has an external dynamic effect. The traditional 
'donkey' examples such as (27) are cases in point (see [Geach, 1962]). 
Every gir/1 who has a boyfriend2 teases him2. (27) 
Example (27) has the following DAL translation. 
Qvv1(Gv1; 'f/V2: Bv2; Hv1v2,Tv1v2). (28) 
Here Qv denotes the generalized universal quantifier, i.e. the relation of 
inclusion. Establishing the meaning of examples like (27) by direct reasoning 
about the operational semantics is awkward, so we will guide the reader 
through the thicket once more. 
According to the semantic clause for quantifier programs, on input state A 
this program gives {A} iff the sets (29) and (30) are in the inclusion relation. 
{d EU I [Gv1; 'f/V2: Bv2; Hv1v2](A[v1 := d])-::/= 0}. (29) 
{d EU I [Gv1; 'f/V2: Bv2; Hv1v2; Tv1v2](A[v1 := d])-::/= 0}. (30) 
First we reduce (29). Applying the semantic clauses for ; and 'f/ assignment 
and for atomic tests makes clear that (29) describes the same set as (31 ). 
{ d E U I there is a d' E U such that (31) 
d E J(G), d' E J(B), (d, d') E J(H)}. 
Similarly, application of the semantic clauses for;, for 'f/ assignment and for 
atomic tests makes clear that (30) describes the same set as (32). 
{ d E U I there is a d' E U such that (32) 
d E I(G),d' E J(B),(d,d') E I(H),(d,d') E I(T)}. 
Paraphrasing this, we see that the semantic clause for quantified programs 
entails that translation (28) of (27) is true iff the set of girls who have a 
boyfriend is included in the set of girls who have a boyfriend and tease that 
boyfriend. Note that this may still be true if some of the girls have several 
boyfriends and tease only one of them. This shows that the reading we get for 
(27) is weaker than the one we got for (5). Of course, as soon as we impose 
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the meaning postulate that every girl who has a boyfriend has precisely one 
boyfriend, the two translations become equivalent again. 
The reader might wonder why example (27) gets a weaker interpretation 
than expected. The answer is that there turns out to be some latitude as to 
the exact way of internal dynamic binding of assignment variables from the 
antecedent program of the quantifier in its consequent program. These issues 
will be dealt with in the next section. 
Readers who find the reasoning about dynamic clauses that is necessary 
to grasp the meaning of examples like (27) awkward have our full sympathy. 
Bear with us, and the axiom system to be presented in Section 7 will alleviate 
your problem. 
Because we have used conservativity, the above story does not work for 
the quantifier relation interpreting only. Only P Q is true iff the set of non-Ps 
is included in the set of non-Qs, or equivalently, if the set of Qs is included in 
the set of Ps. Because only is not conservative, (33) does not mean the same 
as (34). 
Only girls1 who tease a boyfriend2 lose himz. 
Only girls1 who tease a boyfriend2 tease a 
boyfriend and lose him2. 
Rather, (33) means something like (35). 
Only girls1 who tease a boyfriend2 lose their boyfriend2. 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
This suggests that in this case the pronoun is a pronoun of laziness rather than 
a genuine donkey pronoun. But pronouns in the context of non-conservative 
quantifiers pose difficult problems, as is also borne out by the following 
example. 
Only girls1 who have a boyfriend2 bring him2 to the party. (36) 
On its most salient reading, (36) is true as a matter of course, because it can 
be paraphrased as (37). 
No girls1 who don't have a boyjriend2 will bring him2 
to the party. 
(37) 
Interestingly, the paraphrase (37) poses a difficulty for our framework too. 
The problem is that the variable for a boyfriend2 is screened off by the 
negation operator, so that it is not available anymore at the level where him2 
looks for an antecedent. To deal with (37) one would again need externally 
dynamic negation. We leave the problem of non-conservative quantifiers that 
are internally dynamic with the remark that it merits further investigation. 
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The following example, closely related to (27), gives rise to the so-called 
proportion problem in traditional discourse representation theory (see [Kamp, 
1981: 277-322] for the basics of discourse representation theory, [Kamp and 
Reyle, 1990] for an up-to-date fonnulation, and [Heim, 1990: 137-177] for 
details on the proportion problem). 
Most girls1 who have a boyfriend2 tease him2• (38) 
The proportion problem may arise in connection with (38) in case there are 
girls who are naughty enough to have a large number of boyfriends and to 
tease them all. Accounts which give rise to the proportion problem would 
handle (38) as a case of quantification over girl-boyfriend pairs. To see how 
the present proposal fares, consider the translation of (38) in DAL. 
most v1 ((girl v1; r7v2 : boyfriend v2; have ( v1, v2)), tease ( v1, v2)). (39) 
This is true in state A if there are states B, C such that the sets given in ( 40) 
and (41) are in the most-relation. 
{ d E U I B E [girl v1; 77112 : boyfriend v2; have ( v1, 112)] 
(A[v1 := d])} 
{ d E U I B E [girl v1; r7v2 : boyfriend v2; have ( v1, v2); 
tease (v1,v2)](A[v1 := d])} 
(40) 
(41) 
The set given by ( 40) is the set of all girls who have a boyfriend, while the set 
given by (41) is the set of all girls who have a boyfriend and tease him. The 
quantification is over girls, as it should be, and not over girl-boyfriend pairs, 
as in the accounts which give rise to the proportion problem. In other words, 
this spells out a reading that does not suffer from the proportion problem. 
Again this is not the only possible reading; an alternative reading will be 
discussed in the next section. 
To show that the treatment of quantification proposed here is different 
from the treatment proposed by Groenendijk and Stokhof [ 1991: 39-100], it 
is enough to show that their approach suffers from the proportion problem. 
One of the examples they discuss (o.c., p.81) is, essentially, (42), in the 
reading which can be paraphrased as (43). 
If a girl1 has a boyfriend2 she usually teases him2. (42) 
In most cases in which a gir/1 has a boyfriend2 she teases him2. (43) 
To treat this example, Groenendijk and Stokhof reconstruct Lewis' adverb of 
quantification approach in dynamic predicate logic, by reading the quantifier 
as a relation between sets of states. Dynamic implication, :=;., would then 
14 JAN VAN EIJCK AND FER-JAN DE VRIES 
correspond to -t'<f, to be interpreted as: for all output states A of the antecedent, 
applying the consequent to A will produce an output. Similarly, the examples 
with usually or in most cases are analyzed with -+Af, to be interpreted as: 
for most output states A of the antecedent, applying the consequent to A will 
produce an output To see that ,ius account does give rise to the proportion 
problem, observe that output states of the antecedent a girl has a boyfriend 
where Mary has John as a boyfriend and where the same Mary has Fred as a 
boyfriend will have to count as different states. The example sentences may 
have a reading where these should indeed count as different, but the point is 
that quantification over states makes it impossible to express readings where 
they should count as the same, as in the reading of (42) which is equivalent 
to the most salient reading of (38). For such cases, quantification over states 
does simply lead to incorrect results. 
Our approach differs from the approach of Groenendijk and Stokhof pre-
cisely in that quantification is always over individuals and never over states. 
Our reconstruction of (43) would be as follows. Because the quantification is 
over cases or occasions, we have to add an occasion parameter to the pred-
icates used for translating verb phrases, so have(x,y,o) and tease(x,y,o) for 
x has y at occasion o and x teases y at occasion o, respectively. The DAL 
translation of (43) now becomes: 
most 01 ( ( 'f/VJ : girl v1; 7JV2 : boyfriend v2; have (VJ, v2, OJ ) ) , ( 44) 
tease (v1,v2,01)). 
To make this true, on our account, the set of occasions at which a girl has a 
boyfriend and the set of occasions at which a girl has a boyfriend which she 
teases must be in the most relation. 
Of course, on our account there is still a fair amount of latitude as to how 
(42), (43) and (45) are interpreted. 
If a girl has several boyfriends, she usually teases them. (45) 
But the latitude resides where it belongs, for a margin of uncertainty remains 
as long as it is unclear what counts as an occasion, and it disappears as 
soon as this is resolved. As soon as we have a model where occasions are 
fully individuated, ourquantificational analysis gives the right meanings. The 
discussion summarised in [Heim, 1990: 137-177] of the meanings of' donkey' 
examples with usually should therefore in our view be re-interpreted as a 
discussion of factors that might be involved in the individuation of occasions. 
6. WEAK AND STRONG READINGS OF QUANTIFIERS 
The semantic clause for quantifier programs Qx( 7rl, ?r2 ) in the previous sec-
tion takes care of the dynamic binding of the assignment variables of the 
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antecedent program n1 in the consequent program n2 by comparing the set 
of objects for which n1 succeeds with the set of objects for which n1; n2 
succeeds. Primafacie, there is no compelling reason to use sequential com-
position of n1 and n2 to achieve the desired internal binding effect. Another 
obvious possibility is the choice n1 :::::} n2. We will now explore this alterna-
tive. Let us call the quantifier reading presented in the previous section the 
weak reading of the quantifier. The semantic clause where:::::} is substituted 
for ; gives the strong reading of the quantifier. Thus, the clauses for weak 
and strong readings of quantifiers (which we will distinguish as Qw and Q 5 ) 
run like this: 
Weak readings of quantifiers 
{A} if 
({d EU I [n1](A[x := d]) f. 0}, 
{d EU I [1ri; n2](A[x := d]) f. 0}) 
E I(Q) 
0 otherwise. 
Strong readings of quantifiers 
{A} if 
({d EU I [n1](A[x := d]) f. 0}, 
{d EU I [n1:::::} n2](A[x := d]) f. 0}) 
E I(Q) 
0 otherwise. 
It is easy to show that as long as the antecedent program n1 does not 
have an external dynamic effect, there is nothing to choose between the weak 
and the strong reading of a quantifier. The following proposition refers to 
conservativity and extension; see Section 5 for the definitions. 
PROPOSITION 1. If Q is a quantifier satisfying extension and conservativity 
and av( 7fJ) = 0, then Qw x(n1, n2) and Q5 x( n1, n2) are equivalent. 
Proof: If av( n1) = 0, this means that n1 is a test. Thus, instead of (46) we 
can write (47). 
{d EU I [7r1; n2](A[x := d]) f. 0}. (46) 
{d EU I [Ki](A[x := d]) f. 0 and [7r2](A[x := d]) f. 0}. (47) 
Let 51 be the set {d E U I [7r1](A[x := d]) f. 0}, and S2 the set {d EU I 
[7r2] (A[x := d]) f. 0}. Then the set given by (47) is the set S1 n S2. Thus, 
16 JAN VAN EIJCK AND FER-JAN DE VRIES 
the quantifier program Qwx(?r1, n2) holds iff the sets S1 and S1 n S2 are in 
the relation J(Q). Because of the conservativity of Q, this is the case iff S1 
and S2 are in the J( Q) relation. 
Similarly, if av( 7r1) = 0, then instead of ( 48) we can write ( 49). 
{ d E u I [7r1 => n2](A[x :=a]) # 0}. (48) 
{d EU I [7ri](A[x := d]) = 0 or [7r2](A[x := d]) # 0}. (49) 
Thus, the set given by (49), with respect to some universe U, is the set 
(U - Si) u S2. Because Q satisfies extension, we may take U to be any set 
including the set S1 U S2. In particular, if we take U to be Si U S2, the set 
(U - Si) U S2 reduces to S2. Thus, again, the quantifier program succeeds 
iff S1 and 82 are in the I( Q) relation. • 
It is clear from the proof of proposition 1 that the strong reading of quantifiers 
will get us the right results for non-conservative quantifiers provided they 
satisfy extension and provided their first argument is a test. It turns out that 
we can handle examples like Only men are chauvinists after all; because 
only does satisfy extension, the recipe is simply to rely on the strong reading 
of the quantifier only. Note, however, that non-conservative quantifiers with 
restriction clauses with a dynamic effect are still beyond our scope. 
In Section 5 it transpired that the weak readings of universally quantified 
donkey sentences were not equivalent to the if then versions of these donkey 
sentences. The availability of strong readings for quantifiers has remedied 
this situation, as the following proposition shows. 
PROPOSITION 2. For any programs1ri, 7r2 with av(7ri) nav( n2 ) = 0: if x is 
a variable such that x ~ av(ni) U av(rr2), then (rJx: ?Ti)=> 7r2 is equivalent 
with Qvx(ni,-ir2). 
Proof: Take an arbitrary model M and an arbitrary state A for that model, 
andjustcheckthesemanticclauses: [(rJx: n1) => 7r2]M(A) ={A} ifffor 
all B E [(7Jx : n1)]M(A) it holds that [7r2]M(B) # 0. By the semantic 
clause for rJ assignment this is the case iff for all B with the property that 
for some d E UM it is the case that B E [7r1]M(A[x := d]), it holds that 
[n2]M(B) # 0. Byquantifierlogic, this is equivalent to: for all d E UM and 
for all B, if BE [n1]M(A[x := d]), then [7r2]M(B) # 0. 
The semantic clause for strong readings of quantifiers says that [ Qvx ( ?TJ, 
n2)]M(A) = {A} iff all d E UM such that [n1]M(A[x := d]) # 0 have 
the property that [n1 => 7r2]M(A[x := d]) # 0. By the semantic clause for 
=>,this condition is equivalent to: for all d E UM such that [7r1]M(A[x := 
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d]) I- 0 it is the case that all B E [7r!]M(A[x := d]) have the property that 
[7rz]M(B) I- 0. Equivalently: for all d E UM and for all C it holds that if 
C E [7r1]M(A[x := d]) then is the case that all B E [7r1]M(A[x := d]) 
have the property that [7rz]M(B) f. 0. By quantifier logic, this in turn is 
equivalent to: for all d E UM and for all B, if B E [n1]M(A[x := d]) then 
[7rz]M(B) f. 0. 
Since ( rJX : 7fJ) =? n2 and Qyx ( n1, 7rz) are both tests, and since we have 
shown that these tests succeed in precisely the same circumstances, we have 
established the claim that the programs are equivalent. • 
A question one might want to ask now is whether a similar result holds for 
Q3x(7r1, 7r2) and 77x : n1; 7rz. The answer is of course no, for the simple 
reason that Q3 x ( n1, 7rz) is a test while ryx : n1; 7rz is not. But there is 
something more to the question than this. For quantifiers like every and most, 
it is not difficult to invent pairs of example sentences where the first member 
of the pair has to be paraphrased as a weakly read existential quantifier and the 
second member as a strongly read one (see below for some standard examples 
from the literature of such pairs for the quantifiers every and most). It seems 
to us that it is much harder to find examples of such pairs for the case of some. 
It is not even completely clear to us if the distinction between Q3 x( 7rI, n2) 
and Q3x( 7r1, n2) makes intuitive sense. This observation might be interpreted 
as evidence for the case that determiners like some and a are quite special 
after all, in that they are to be treated in terms of active assignment variables 
rather than generalized quantifiers. We will not pursue this issue any further 
here, as it would lead us into the realm of externally dynamic quantification 
and thus beyond the scope of this paper. 
There is extensive discussion in the literature (see e.g. [Chierchia, 1991: 
37-78] and the references cited therein) of the distinction between weak and 
strong readings of quantified 'donkey' sentences with quantifiers like every 
and most. Sentences like (50), (52) and (54) are given in the literature as cases 
where the weak reading is appropriate, while sentences like (51), (53) and 
(55) seem to require the strong reading. 
If a mari has a dime, he puts it in the parking meter. (50) 
If a man owned a slave, he also owned its offspring. (51) 
Every man who has a dime will put it in the parking meter. (52) 
Every man who owned a slave also owned its offspring. (53) 
Most men who have a dime will put it in the parking meter. (54) 
Most men who owned a slave also owned its offspring. (55) 
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For the examples (52), (53), (54) and (55) we get the required contrast from the 
distinction between the two interpretation rules for quantifiers. For examples 
(50) and (51), an analysis in terms of occasions is needed to get the required 
contrast. As long as we stick to the treatment of if then clauses in terms of=?-, 
we only get the strong readings. But of course, a more subtle analysis of (50) 
and (51) will treat the if then construction in terms of universal quantification 
over cases, along the lines sketched in Section 5. The analysis of (50) and 
(51) now becomes (56) and (57), respectively. 
Q'!ef 01 ( 71v1 : man v1; 17v2 : dime vz; have ( v1, vz, 01)), 
put-in-parking-meter ( v1, v2 , o1)). 
Qvoi ( 71v1 : man v1; 71v2 : slave vz; owned ( v1, vz, 01)), 
iV3 : offspring-of ( v3, vz ); owned ( v1, v3, 01)). 
(56) 
(57) 
We can paraphrase the semantic condition imposed by (56) as follows: every 
occasion where there is a man with a dime is an occasion where there is a 
man with a dime who puts a dime in the parking meter. This is intuitively 
acceptable. The paraphrase for (57) becomes: every occasion where there is 
a man with a slave that he owns is an occasion where it holds for every man 
and every slave owned by that man at that occasion, that the man owns the 
offspring of that slave. This also seems intuitively acceptable. If the reader is 
not convinced that these are indeed the correct paraphrases of the weak and 
strong quantifier readings for these examples, the sections that follow will 
provide an easy means to verify these claims. 
Other examples from the folk-lore are also quite easy to handle. Consider 
examples (58), (59) and (60). 
If a man1 shares a place with another1 man2, (58) 
he1 shares the housework with himz. 
Most customers1 who buy a spark plug2 buy three other2 spark (59) 
plugs with itz (unless they own a 2CV). 
If a customer1 buys a sparkplug2, he1 usually buys three other2 (60) 
spark plugs with it2 (unless he owns a 2CV). 
In the case of (58) we get the right results if we analyse the if then phrase 
in terms of weak or strong universal quantification over occasions (some 
reflection will show that for this example the weak and strong readings are 
equivalent). The example was invented to argue against a so-called E-type 
analysis ofthepronounshe1 and him1 (see [Heim, 1990: 137-177]), but in the 
present perspective there is nothing problematic about such symmetric cases 
at all. On the analysis we propose, sentence (58) is true iff every occasion 
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in which there are two distinct men sharing a place is an occasion in which 
there are two distinct men sharing a place and also sharing the housework. 
Equivalently, sentence (58) is true iff every occasion in which there are two 
distinct men sharing a place is an occasion in which every pair of distinct 
men sharing a place is such that they also share the housework. 
The equivalence of strong and weak readings also holds for example (59). 
Under the weak reading, example (59) says that the majority of customers 
(excluding 2CV owners) that buy a spark plug are customers that buy a spark 
plug plus three other spark plugs. Under the strong reading, example (59) 
says that the majority of customers (excluding 2CV owners) that buy a spark 
plug are customers that for every spark plug that they buy, buy three other 
ones. It is not difficult to see that in this case as well, the weak and strong 
readings are equivalent. The same holds for the case of (60), although here 
we have to analyze in terms of quantification over occasions. 
7. AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION 
Discussions about the correctness or incorrectness of proposals for dynamic 
interpretation of language have been hampered in the past by the difficulty 
of seeing through the ramifications of the dynamic semantic clauses in non-
trivial cases. To remedy this, we supplement the semantics of our represen-
tation language with an axiom system in the style of Hoare (see [Apt, 1981: 
431-4831 for an overview of this approach). The axioms and proof rules we 
propose form a deduction system allowing us to prove statements about DAL 
programs; in Section 8, this calculus is proved sound and in Section 9 it is 
proved complete with respect to the semantics. 
Our deductive system for dynamic logic is a hybrid calculus, with state-
ments characterizing variable states, plus two kinds of correctness statements, 
which we call universal and existential correctness statements. Thus, the sys-
tem has three kinds of statements: (i) formulae of a language of first order 
predicate logic with the same sets of variables and predicate letters as the DAL 
language under consideration, and extended with the same set of generalized 
quantifiers (call this assertion language L ), (ii) triples of the form { r.p} n { ~;}, 
where r.p, '~) are L-formulae, and n is a DAL-program, and (iii) triples of the 
form (r.p) n (~;),where again r.p, 1/J are £-formulae, and n is aDAL-program. 
The statements of the form r.p are used for making assertions about variable 
states A for L with respect to models M for L. Because the DAL language 
and the assertion language L have the same set of variables, variable states 
for the DAL language are variable states for L. The relation M f= r.p [A], for 
state A verifies r.p in M, is defined in the standard way. If zp is a formula of the 
assertion language L, then fv( r.p) is the set of free variables of r.p, and if <p is an 
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L formula and x,y are variables then [y/x]c.p is the result of the substitution 
of y for all free occurrences of x in c.p. 
The statements of the form { c.p} 7r { 'ljJ} are universal correctness statements. 
In the terminology of Hoare's logic, they express partial correctness. The 
statement { t..p} 7r { 'ljJ} expresses that all variable states A (for an arbitrary 
model M) that satisfy t..p have the property that if some variable state B is an 
output state of 1f for input state A, then B satisfies 'ljJ. 
The statements of the form ( t..p) 1f ( 'ljJ) are existential correctness statements. 
In terms of Hoare 's logic, they represent the bits one has to add to partial 
correctness statements to ensure total correctness. The statement (r.p) 1f ('l/J) 
expresses that for all input variable states A (for an arbitrary model M) that 
satisfies <p there is some variable state B satisfying 'ljJ in the set of output 
states of 1r. 
Because our intuitions about static meaning seem to be much better de-
veloped than our intuitions about dynamic meaning, we can, for a large class 
of natural language sentences, check whether the intuitive meaning of a sen-
tence S corresponds to the meaning of its DAL translation 1f in the following 
precise sense. Does the intuitive meaning of S precisely describe the set of 
states for which 7r terminates successfully? In terms of Hoare 's logic, we can 
describe this set of states by the weakest existential precondition of 7r with 
respect to T. What we are looking for is the weakest t..p for which the statement 
(c.p) rr (T) is still true. The c.p we are looking for has to satisfy the additional 
condition that it does not contain free occurrences of the assignment variables 
of 7r (the members of av( 1f )); r.p gives the static meaning of the program 1f. 
It may seem that our intention to use the calculus to get from dynamic 
to static meaning will allow us to get by with just existential correctness 
statements. To see that this is not so, note that such statements do not allow us 
to express failure of a program for a given set of input states. The statement 
(c.p) rr (1..) does not express failure of 1f on input states satisfying t..p. Rather, it 
expresses the fact that for all inputs satisfying c.p the program 7r is guaranteed 
to produce an output satisfying l.., a statement which is absurd for all non-
contradictory <p. Failure of aDALprogram 7r on the set of inputs specified by <p, 
is readily expressed in terms of universal correctness, namely by { r.p} 1f { l.. }. 
It is clear that in order to treat negation of programs and dynamic implication 
between programs, both universal and existential correctness statements are 
needed in the calculus. 
The meanings of {c.p} 7r {'l/J} and (c.p) 7r ('l/J) are formally specified in 
terms of the dynamic interpretation function [·]M that was given above plus 
a satisfaction relation M f= r.p [A], to be read as: variable state A for V 
satisfies r.p in M. This notion is defined in the standard way. The notion of 
JC-validity for correctness statements is defined as follows. 
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/(-validity of Correctness Statements 
If F has the form ip, where r.p is a formula of the assertion language, then 
K I= F if M I= F [A] for all models M E JC and all states A for M. 
If F has the form { ip} rr { 'ljJ }, then K I= F if the following holds. For all 
models M E /C, for all states A for M, if M I= ip [A] then for all states 
B E [rr]M(A) it is the case that M I= 'If_; [BJ. 
If F has the form (cp) rr ('If;), t11en K I= F if the following holds. For all 
models M E JC, for all states A for M, if M I= rp [A] then there is at least 
one state B E [rr]M(A) with M I= 1/J [BJ. 
The atomic predicates of DAL act as tests. The following test axioms account 
for their behaviour. 
Test Axioms 
{T} l_ {_l_}. 
(1_) J_ (_l_). 
{R(l1 ···fn)-+ rp} R(t1 ···tn) {cp}. 
(R(l1 ···in)/\ cp) R(t.1 · · · f.n) (rp). 
{t1 = t2-+ rp} t1 = t2 {rp}. 
(l.1 = 12 /\ rp) 11 = f2 (cp). 
The axioms for the program l_ express that J_ always fails. The atomic 
predicates and the identities each have two axioms. In both cases the first (the 
axiom for universal correctness) gives the preconditions under which, if the 
program succeeds, all output states will satisfy ip. The second (the axiom for 
existential correctness) gives the preconditions which guarantee successful 
termination, with the postconditions guaranteed by the test. 
For purposes of reasoning with the system one needs an oracle rule for the 
class JC of models that one is interested in (for natural language applications 
such a class will generally be given by specifying a set of meaning postulates 
that all members of IC should satisfy). 
K: Oracle Rule 
Every assertion valid in K is an axiom. 
The well-known consequence rule holds for universal and existential correct-
ness. 
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Consequence Rules 
1P - 'l/J {'l/J} 7f {x} x - ~ 
{c.p}7r{O. 
'P-'l/J (7/J)7r(X) x-~ 
(c.p) 7f (~)-
Next, one needs to specify the meanings of complex programs in the axiomatic 
framework. 
Rules of Composition 
{c.p} 1ri {'l/J} {'l/J} 7f2 {x} 
{ <p} ( 'lfl ; 1f2) {x } . 
(r.p) 1ri ('l/J) ('l/J) n2 (x) 
(r.p) (7r1; 7r2) (x). 
Rules of Negation 
{c.p} 1f {..L} 
(c.p /\ 7/J) -i7f ('l/J). 
(1.p) n (T) 
Rules of Implication 
{'P} 7f1 {w} (w) 7f2 (T). 
('P /\ x) (7q => 7rz) (x). 
( <p) 'lfl ( 'l/J) { 'ljJ } 7f2 { J_ } . 
{'Pv x} (n1 =? n2) {x}. 
Rules of 7J Assignment 
{'P} 7f {'l/J} 
{\f xr.p} TJ.'i: : 7f { 'ljJ}. 
('P) 7f ('l/;) 
(:b:r.p) TJX : 7f ('l/J). 
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Rules of L Assignment 
(i.p)7r('lj;) {•i.p}7r{..L} ('lj;)n(x) 
(3x('v'y([y/x]i.p +-t x = y) /\ '1/J)) ix: 7f (x). 
( i.p) 7f (T) { •<,o} n { ..L} { '1/J} 7r {x} 
{'v'x('v'y([y/x]i.p ....+ y = x) -t 'lj;)} ix: rr {x}. 
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Note that in the static description logic the 'r/ and i operators from the dynamic 
assigmnent logic are contextually eliminated. 
Rules of Quantification: Weak Readings 
(rp) 7fJ (T) { •rp} 7r1 { ..L} ('lj;) rr1; 7r2 (T) { •'1/J} 7r1; 1f2 { ..L} 
( Qx( rp, 'lj;) /\ x) Qw x( 7fJ' 1f2) (x). 
{ •i.p} 7fJ { ..L} (rp) rr1 (T) { •'1/J} rr1; 7f2 { ..L} ('lj;) rr1; 7r2 (T) 
{Qx(i.p,'lj;) -t x} QWX(7TJ,7f2) {x}. 
Rules of Quantification: Strong Readings 
(rp) 7fJ (T) { •i.p} 7r1 {..L} ('1/J) n1 :::;.. 7f2 (T) {•'I/;} 7r1 =? rr2 {..L} 
(Qx(rp,'lj;) /\ x) Q5 x(n1, 1f2) (x). 
{ •rp} rr1 { ..l} ( rp) rr1 (T) {•'I/;} 7rJ =? 7r2 { ..l} ( '1/J) 1!'1 =? 7f2 (T) 
{Qx(i.p,'lj;)-t x} Q5 x(7r1,7r2) {x}. 
In case we know the quantifier to be lMON, !MON, MONl or MON!, 
then in the rules of quantification the first, second, third or fourth premiss, 
respectively, can be omitted. 
Recall that a quantifier Q is lMON (downward monotone in its first 
argument) if Q is interpreted as a relation R between sets with the property 
that R(S1,S2) and s; ~ S1 imply R(s;,s2). A quantifier Q is TMON 
(upward monotone in its first argument) if Q is interpreted as a relation R 
between sets with the property that R(S1, S2) and 51 ~ S{ imply R(s;, S2). 
Similarly, MON l or MONT are used for monotonicity in the second argument. 
The binary universal quantifier Qv, for example, is lMON and MONT, while 
the binary existential quantifier Q3 is jMON and MONT. 
Incidentally, the rules of quantification demonstrate that the snapshot lan-
guage for static meaning (the assertion language) has to have essentially 
the same expressive power as the language for dynamic meaning (the DAL 
language), for we need a static counterpart for every dynamic generalized 
quantifier. 
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The above axioms and rules engender a notion of JC-derivation, as follows. 
A JC-derivation is a finite sequence of correctness formulae F1, ••• , F11 such 
tl1at for every i, 1 :::; i :::; n, Fi is a test axiom or a an axiom according to the JC 
oracle rule, or Fi is the conclusion of an instance of one of the inference rules 
while the premisses of that rule occur among F1, ... , Fi-I· A K>deri vation 
F1 , •.. , F11 is said to be a JC-derivation of F11 • F is called JC-derivable in the 
proof system if iliere is a JC-derivation of F. Notation: K~ f- F. In the next 
section, the soundness of this proof system relative to JC will be proved. 
8. SOUNDNESS OF THE CALCULUS 
An inference from premisses F1, ... , F11 to conclusion Fis called JC-valid if 
/(validity of the premisses implies JC validity of the conclusion. We will now 
show that the proof system given in ilie previous section is correct relative to 
JC, i.e. for every correctness statement F: 
f( f- F implies JC f= F. 
To prove this, we first show that the axioms are JC-valid, and next that the 
inference rules preserve JC-validity. The soundness result then follows by 
induction on the length of derivations. 
Test Axioms 
The soundness of ilie test axioms for J_ is clear from the definition of K 
validity. For the universal axiom for R( t 1 · · · t11 ) the reasoning is as follows. 
Assume a model and a state M, A such that (61). 
M F R(t1 · · · t11 )-+ <p [A]. (61) 
There are two possibilities. If M f= -.R(t1 · · · t 11 ) [A], then, by the semantic 
clause for R( ti · · · /,11 ), the output state set will be empty, so trivially ev-
ery member of this set will satisfy <p. If M f= R(t1 · · · t 11 ) [A] then, by 
(61), M f= <p [A]. In this case, by ilie semantic clause for R(ti · · · tn), 
[R(t1 · · · tn)]M(A) = {A}, so again every member of the output set does 
satisfy <p. 
For the existential axiom for R( t1 , · · t11 ), assume (62). 
M F 'PI\ R(li · · · t11 ) [A]. (62) 
It follows immediately from the semantic clause for R(t1 • • • t 11 ) that (63). 
[R(t1 · · · tn)]M(A) ={A}. (63) 
So there is a member of ilie output set which does satisfy 'P· The reasoning 
for the universal and existential test axioms for t1 = t2 is similar. 
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JC Oracle Rule 
The axioms generated by the JC oracle rule are valid by definition. 
Consequence Rules 
The soundness proof of the first consequence rule is standard (and trivial). 
We prove the soundness of the second consequence rule. Assume (64), (65) 
and (66). 
JC F= <p -7 1,b. 
JC F= (7/!) 7r (x). 
K F x -7 ~-
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
We have to show K f= (<p) 7r (~).Take a model M E lC and a state A for M 
such that (67). 
M F <p [A]. (67) 
From (64) and (67) it follows that (68). 
M F 7jJ [A]. (68) 
From (68) and (65) it follows that there is a state B E [7r]M (A) with 
M f= x [B]. From this and (66) it follows that there is a state B E [7r]M (A) 
with M f= ~ [BJ. 
Rules of Composition 
For the first rule of composition, assume (69) and (70). 
MF {cp} Jrj {?j,1} [A]. 
MF= {1f;} Jr2 {x} [A]. 
(69) 
(70) 
What we have to show is M f= { <p} 7r1; Jr2 {x} [A], so we assume M f= 
ip [A]. Suppose some state C E [7r1; 7r2]M(A). Then there is some state 
B E [7r1]M (A) such that C E [7r2]M (B ). It follows from (69) and (70) that 
Mf=x[C]. 
For the second rule of composition, assume (71) and (72). 
M F (cp) Jf[ (7/J) [A]. 
M F= (7/J) Jr2 (x) [A]. 
(71) 
(72) 
WhatwehavetoshowisM f= (<p)7r1; 7r2(x) [A],soweassumeM f= <p [A]. 
From(7l)itfollowsthatthereissomestateB E [7ri]M(A)withM f= '1/J [B]. 
From (72) it follows that there is some state C E [7r2]M (B) with M f= x[C], 
which is what we had to prove. 
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Rules of Negation 
If we consider -i7f as an abbreviation for 7f :::::} J., we can derive the rules of 
negation as follows. Assume (73). 
{t,0}7r{_L}. (73) 
One of the test axioms for J_ gives us (74). 
(_L) J_ (T). (74) 
Application of the first rule of implication to (73) and (74) gives (75). 
(75) 
This takes care of the first rule of negation. For the second rule, assume (76). 
(t,0) 7r (T). 
One of the test axioms for J_ gives (77). 
{T}l.{l.}. 
Applying the second rule of implication to (76) and (77) gives (78). 
This takes care of the second rule of negation. 
Rules of Implication 
For the first rule of implication, assume (79), (80) and (81). 
M F cp I\ x [A]. 
MF {cp} 7TI {'ti0} [A]. 
M F (1/J) 7f2 (T) [A]. 
We have to show (82). 
M F= (cp Ax) 7f1 :::::} 7f2 (x) [A]. 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
(81) 
(82) 
To show (82), we have to establish the fact that there is some state B E 
[n1 :::::} n2]M(A) with M f= x [BJ. In view of (79), we are done if we can 
show that [7r1 :::::} n2]M(A) = {A}. For this it suffices, by the definition of 
the semantics for 7rI :::::} 7r2, to show that for all B E [ n1 ]M (A) it holds that 
[7r2]M(B) =fa 0. But this follows immediately from (80) and (81). 
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For the second rule of implication, assume (83), (84) and (85). 
MF 'P v x [A]. 
M F (cp) 7fl ('lj;) [A]. 
MF= {'1/J} 7rz {-L-} [A]. 
We have to show (86). 
M F= { cp v x} 7f1 ==> 7f2 {x} [A]. 
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(83) 
(84) 
(85) 
(86) 
Because [7r1 ::::> 7rz] is a test, we are done if we can show that if [7r1 ==> 
7rz]M f:. 0, then M f= x [A]. This is the case iff either [7r1 ==> 7rz]M = 0 or 
M f= x [A]. In view of the semantic clause for::::> this is the case if either 
there is some state B E [wi]M(A) with [7r2]M(B) = 0, or M f= x [A]. 
From (83) it follows that either M f= <p [A] or M f= x [A]. In the second 
case we are done. In the first case, it follows from (84) and (85) that there is 
indeed a state BE [w1]M(A) with [7r2]M(B) f:. 0, which is what was to be 
shown. 
Rules of TJ Assignment 
For the first rule of r1 assignment, assume (87) and (88). 
Kf={cp}7r{'1f;}. 
M F= \/xcp [A]. 
We have to show (89). 
MF= {Vx<p} TJX: 7f {w} [A]. 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
Assume that state BE [TJX: w]M(A). Then BE [7r]M(A[x := d]) for some 
d E U. It follows from (88) that M f= cp[A[x := d]], so we derive from (87) 
that M f= 'ljJ [BJ. 
For the second rule of r/ assignment, assume (90) and (91 ). 
K F (cp) 7f ('1/J). 
M F :Jxcp [A]. 
We have to show (92). 
M F (:3xcp) TJX : 7f ('1/J) [A]. 
(90) 
(91) 
(92) 
From (91) it follows that there is some d E U with M f= cp [A[x := d]], 
while from (90) it follows that there is some state B E [w]M(A[x := d]) 
with M f= 'ljJ [BJ. By the semantic clause for TJ assignment it follows, then, 
that BE [TJX: 7r]M(A). 
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Rules of i Assignment 
For the first rule of i assignment, assume (93), (94) and (95). 
K J= (<p) 7r (T). 
K J= { ....,'P} 7r { j_}. 
K J= ('l/J) 7r (x). 
Suppose (96). 
M J= :Jx(Vy([y/x]'P....., y = x) /\ 'ljJ) [A]. 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
We have to show that there is some B E [ix : 7r]M(A) with M I= x [B]. 
From (96) it follows that there is ad E U such that (97), (98) and (99). 
M J= <p [A[x := dJ]. 
For all d' E U, if d' ::j:. d, then M I= ....,i.p [A[x := d']]. 
M J= 'ljJ [A[x := d]]. 
(97) 
(98) 
(99) 
Because of (93) and (97), [7r]M(A[x := d]) ::j:. 0 and moreover, because of 
(95) and (99), there is a B E [7r]M(A[x := d]) with M I= x [BJ. Because 
of (94) and (98), [7r]M (A[x := d']) = 0 for all d' ::j:. d. Thus, by the semantic 
clauseforiassignment,[1,x: 7r]M(A) ::j:. 0andmoreoverB E [ix: 7r]M(A). 
For the second rule of i assignment, again assume (93) and (94), and further-
more, assume (100). 
KJ={7,b}7f{X}· 
Suppose (101). 
M J= \ix(Vy([y/x]<p....., y = x) -t 'l/J) [A]. 
We have to show (102). 
For all B E [ix: 7r]M(A) it holds that M J= x [BJ. 
(100) 
(101) 
(102) 
From (101) it follows that if there is ad such that (97) and (98) then it will hold 
that (99). Now assume there is no d satisfying (97) and (98). Then it follows 
from (93), (94) and the semantic clause for i assignment that [ix : n] (A) = 0, 
so trivially (102). If, on the other hand, there is a d satisfying (97) and (98), 
then (99) will hold. From this and (100) we can derive (103). 
For all B E [7r](A[x := d]), M J= X [BJ (103) 
Now recall that dis the unique object satisfying [7r](A[x := d]) ::j:. 0. Thus, 
B E [7fHA[x := d]) iff B E [ix : 7f](A[x := d]), and we can derive from 
this and (103) that (102). 
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Rules of Quantification 
We only treat the rules for weak readings, as the treatment of the rules for 
strong readings is completely similar. For the first rule of quantification, 
assume (104), (105), (106), and (107). 
K I= (lfJ) 7r1 (T). 
K I= { '1P} 7r1 {l-}. 
K F= (w) 7r1; 7rz (T). 
K F= { 'W} 7rl; 7rz { .l} · 
Suppose ( 108). 
M f= Qx(lfJ,'l/J) /\x_ [A]. 
We have to establish (109). 
(104) 
(105) 
(106) 
(107) 
(108) 
(109) 
We are done if we can show that [Qwx(7r1,7r2)]M ={A}. From (108) it 
follows that the sets { d E U I M I= 1P [A[x := d]]} (call this set S1) and 
{ d E U I M f= 'l/J [A [x := d]]} (call this set Sz) are in the relation I( Q) 
(where I is the interpretation function of M). Suppose M I= zp [A[x := d]]. 
Then it follows from (104) that [7r1]M (A [x := d]) i= 0. Thus we have (110). 
(110) 
Suppose conversely that [7ri]M(A[x := d]) i= 0. Then it follows from (105) 
that M F '1P [A[x := d]], and therefore that M I= <p [A[x := d]]. Thus we 
have (111). 
{ d I [7ri]M(A[x := d]) i= 0} ~ S1. 
Similarly, we get from (106) that (112). and from (107) that (113). 
S2 ~ {d I [7r1; 7rz]M(A[x := d]) i= 0}. 
{d I [7r1; 7rz]M(A[x := d]) i= 0} ~ S2. 
(111) 
(112) 
(113) 
From (110) and (111) we have (114), and from (112) and (113) we have 
(115). 
S1 = { d I [7ri]M (A[x := d]) i= 0}. (114) 
S2 = {d I [11"1; 7r2]M(A[x := d]) i= 0}. (115) 
It follows from (114), (115) and the semantic clause for quantifier programs 
that [QWX(7TJ, 7rz)]M ={A}. 
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Now suppose Q is lMON. Then, with S1, 52 as above, 51 ~ 51 implies 
(SL 5 2) E I( Q). Thus, (111) and (115) are now enough to conclude that 
[Qwx( 7rI, 7r2HM = {A}, and we do not need the first premiss. For the cases 
where Q is jMON, MONl or MONj the reasoning is similar. 
For the second rule of quantification, again assume (104), (105), (106), 
and (107), but now suppose (1 leS). 
M f= Qx(if!,'l/J)......, X [A]. (116) 
We can express (116) equivalently as (117). 
M f= -iQx(if!,'l/J) V X [A]. (117) 
It follows from ( 117) that either the sets 5 1, S2, defined as above, are not in 
relation I(Q) or M f= x [A]. By the same reasoning as above, the sets 51, S2 
are in the relation I ( Q) iff program Qw x ( 7fI, 7T2) accepts state A. Thus, by 
the semantic clause for quantifier programs, either [ Qw x ( 7r1, 7r2) ]M (A) = 0 
or M f= x [A]. This is what we had to show. 
Again suppose Q is lMON. Then it follows from (S1, 52) ~ I( Q) and 
S1 ~ S! that (S{, S2) f/. I(Q). Thus we only need (110) to clinch the 
argument, and the premiss (105) is superfluous. Similarly for the other cases. 
We have now proved the following theorem. 
THEOREM 3 (Soundness). If IC f- F then IC f= F. 
9. COMPLETENESS OF THE CALCULUS 
Suppose we establish IC f- (cp) 7fI =? 1rz (T) for some <.p with IC f= <.p. Then it 
fol lows by the soundness of the calculus that IC f= ( cp) 7TI =? n2 (T), and by 
the IC validity of cp that for all Bin [7ri]M(A) it holds that [7r2]M(B) =I= 0, 
for all M E !( and all states A for M. In other words, the proof system can 
be considered as an axiomatisation of the notion of dynamic consequence, 
relative to classes of models JC. To see that the proof system is powerful 
enough we also have to establish its completeness relative to JC. For this 
we need the concepts of the weakest universal precondition and the weakest 
existential precondition of a DAL program and a formula of the assertion 
language. 
The weakest universal precondition of aDAL program 7r and an L formula 
'l/J is the L formula cp for which the following holds: M f= cp [A] iff for all 
B E [7r]M(A), it holds that M f= 'ljJ [BJ (for arbitrary M). The weakest 
existential precondition of a DAL program 7f and an L formula 'I/; is the 
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L formula c.p for which the following holds: M f= cp [AJ iff there is a 
BE [n]M(A) with M f= 'I/; [BJ (for arbitrary M). 
Note that it follows immediately from these definitions that the weakest 
universal precondition of a program n and an L formula 'ljJ equals the negation 
of the weakest existential precondition of n and -i'lj;. This is because for 
all B E [n]M(A) it holds that M f= 'I/; [BJ is equivalent to: there is no 
B E [n]M(A) for which M f= -i'lj; [B]. This equivalence means that either 
of the two notions would suffice for what follows. For practical purposes, 
however, it is convenient to use both weakest universal and weakest existential 
preconditions, so we will define functions for both. 
It is not obvious at first sight that the weakest universal and existential 
precondition of a DAL program and an L formula always exist (as formulas 
of L), so we have to show that this is indeed the case. We will inductively 
define functions wup( n, 'ljJ) and wep( n, 'ljJ) of which we will then show that 
they express the weakest universal precondition, respectively the weakest 
existential precondition of n and 'l/J. 
wup(..l, 'l/J) = T. 
wep( ..l, 'ljJ) = ..l. 
wup(R(t1 · · · ln), 'l/J) = R(t1 · · · ln) -7 'l/J. 
wep(R(t1 · · · ln), 'I/;)= R(t1 · · · tn) /\ 'l/J. 
wup(t1 = t2),'l/J) = t1 = t2 -7 'l/J. 
wep(t1 = t2), 'l/J) = t1 = t2 /\ 'l/J. 
wup( 7rI; n2, 'l/J) = wup( 7rI, wup( n2, 'l/J) ). 
wep(n1; n2,'1/J) = wep(n1,wep(n2,'l/J)). 
wup(-in, 'l/J) = wep(n, T) V 'l/J. 
wep(-in, 'l/J) = wup(n, ..l) /\ 'l/J. 
wup( n1 ::::} n2, 'ljJ) = wep( n1, wup( n2, ..l)) V 'l/J. 
wep( 71"! ::::} n2, 'ljJ) = wup( 7rl, wep(n2, T)) /\ 'l/J. 
wup(?Jx: n, 'l/J) = 'v'xwup(n, 'l/J). 
wep(?JX: n,'l/J) = 3xwep(n,'1/J). 
wup(ix: n,'l/J) = 'v'x('v'y([y/xJwep(7r, T) f--+ y = x) -7 wup(n,'l/J)). 
wep(ix: n,'l/J) = 3x('v'y([y/x]wep(n, T) f--+ y = x) /\ wep(n,'l/J)). 
wup( Qwx( 7rl, 7r2), 'l/J) = Qx(wep(7r1, T), wep(7r1, wep(n2, T))) -7 'l/J. 
wep( Qwx( 7r1, n2), 'l/J) = Qx(wep(n1, T), wep(n1, wep(n2, T))) /\ 'l/J. 
wup( Q5 x( n1, n2), 'l/J) = Qx(wep(n1, T), wup(n1, wep(n2, T))) -7 'l/J. 
wep( Q5 x( n1, n2), 'l/J) = Qx(wep( 7rl, T), wup(7r1, wep(7r2, T))) /\ 'l/J. 
To show that these functions indeed give the weakest universal and existential 
preconditions of a program and a formula, a case by case check is necessary. 
The cases of atomic programs are checked directly, and induction is used to 
check the cases of complex programs. 
32 JAN VAN EIJCK AND FER-JAN DE VRJES 
Atomic Test Programs 
We only treat the case of R( t1 · · · tn), the cases of ..Land t1 = tz being similar. 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest existential precondition of a test 
R( t1 · · · tn) and a formula 7/J by definition of weakest existential precondition 
iff there is a state B with B E [R(t1 · · · tn)]M(A) and M f= 7/J [BJ. By the 
semantic clause for atomic tesul, this is the case iff M I= R( t1 · · · tn) [A] and 
M f= 'ljJ [AJ. This in tum is the case iff M I= R(ti · · · tn) /\ 'lj.J [AJ. Thus, the 
weakest existential precondition of R( ti · · · tn) and 7/J is R( t1 · · · tn) /\ 7/J. 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest universal precondition of a test 
R( t1 · · · tn) and a formula 'ljJ by definition of weakest universal precondition 
iff for every state B with B E [R( t1 .. · tn)]M (A) it holds that M f= 7/J [BJ. 
By the semantic clause for atomic tests, this is the case iff it holds that 
if M I= R(t1 · · · tn) [AJ then M I= 'ljJ [AJ. This in tum is the case iff 
M I= R(t1 · • · tn) -1- '!jJ [A]. Thus, the weakest universal precondition of 
R(t1 .. · tn) and 7/J is R(t1 .. · tn) -1- 7/J. 
Composition 
Left to the reader. 
Negation 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest existential precondition of a 
program ....,11" and a formula 1f; by definition of weakest existential precondition 
iffthere is a state B with BE [-i7r]M(A) and M I= 7/J [BJ. By the semantic 
clause for negation this is the case iff [7r]M(A) = 0 and M f= '!jJ [AJ. By the 
induction hypothesis this is the case iff M f= wup(7r, ..L) /\ 'lj.J [AJ. Thus, the 
weakest existential precondition of -i7f and '!jJ is wup( 7r, .l) /\ 'lj.J. 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest universal precondition of a 
program ....,11" and a formula '!jJ by definition of weakest universal precondition 
iff for all states B with B E [-i7r]M(A) it holds that M I= 'lj.J [BJ. By the 
semantic clause for negation this is the caseiff it holds that either [7r]M(A) = 
0 or M I= '!jJ [AJ. By the induction hypothesis this is the case iff either M f= 
wep(7r, T) [AJ or M I= 7/J [AJ. This is the case iff M f= wep(7r, T) V 'lj.J [A]. 
Thus, the weakest universal precondition of ....,7r and 'lj.J is wep ( n, T) v 7/J. 
Implication 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest existential precondition of 
a program 7rl :::} n2 and a formula 7/J by definition of weakest existential 
preconditioniffthere is a state Bwith B E [7r1 :::} nz]M(A) and M f= '!jJ [BJ. 
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By the semantic clause for implication this is the case iff for all B with 
B E [ni]M(A) it holds that [n2]M(B) =I= 0, and M f= 'lj! [AJ. By the 
induction hypothesis this is the case iff M f= wup( n1, wep( n2, T)) [A] and 
M f= 'If; [AJ. This isthecaseiff M f= wup(1ri, wep(n2, T))/\'lj; [A]. Thus, the 
weakest existential precondition of n1 => n2 and 'lj! is wup( n1, wep( n2, T))/\'lj;. 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest universal precondition of 
a program n1 => n2 and a formula 'lj! by definition of weakest universal 
preconditioniffforall states B with BE [n1 => n2]M(A) itholdsthatM f= 
'lj1 [BJ. By the semantic clause for implication this is the case iff either there is 
some state B with B E [n1]M (A) and [n2]M (B) = 0, or M f= 1jJ [AJ. By the 
induction hypothesis this is the case iff either M f= wep( n1, wup( n2 , ..L)) [AJ 
orM f='lf! [A].ThisisthecaseiffM f=wep(n1,wup(n2,..L))V'lj! [AJ.Thus, 
the weakest universal precondition of n1 => n2 and 'If! is wep(n1, wup( n2, ..L)) V 
'lj;. 
r1 Assignment 
Left to the reader. 
i Assignment 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest existential precondition of a pro-
gram lX : n and a formula 'lj; by definition of weakest existential precondition 
iff there is a state B with B E [lx : n]M (A) and M f= 1jJ [BJ. By the seman-
tic clause for i assignment, this is the case iff there is a unique d for which 
[n]M (A[x := d]) =I= 0, and moreover for this particular d there is a state B 
with B E [n]M(A[x := d]) and M f= 'lj! [BJ. By the induction hypothesis 
this is the caseifffor some x, both M f= \ly([y/xJwep(n, T) +-+ y = x) [A] 
and M f= wep( n, 'l/J) [A]. This is the case iff (118). 
M f= 3x(\ly([y/x]wep(n, T) +-+ y = x) !\ wep(n,'lj;)) [AJ. (118) 
Thus, the weakest existential precondition of ix : n and 'lj! is (119). 
:Jx(\ly([y/xJwep(n, T) +-+ y = x) !\ wep(n,-iP)). (119) 
A state A for model M satisfies the weakest universal precondition of a 
program ix : n and a formula 'lj! by definition of weakest universal precon-
dition iff for all states B with B E [ix : n]M(A) it holds that M f= 1/J [BJ. 
By the semantic clause for l assignment, this is the case iff it holds that 
if there is a unique d with [n]M(A[x := d]) =I= 0, then any state B with 
B E [n]M(A[x := d]) will have M f= 'l/J [BJ. By the induction hypothesis 
this is the case iff for any x, M f= \ly([y / x]wep( 7r, T) +-+ y = x) [A] implies 
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M f= wup(n,'!,b). This is the case iff M f= Vx('iy([y/x]wep(n, T) +--Ty= 
x) _, wup(ir, 'lj;)) [A]. Thus, the weakest universal precondition of ix : 7T and 
7/; is (120). 
lfx(Vy([y/x]wep(7T, T) +--Ty= x)-+ wup(n,\b)). (120) 
Quantification 
We only give the reasoning for the weakest existential precondition of weak 
readings. A state A for model M satisfies the weakest existential precondition 
of a pro gram Qw x ( ir1, 7Tz) and a formula 1,U by definition of weakest existential 
precondition iff there is a state B with B E [Qwx(7T1, n2)]M (A) and M f= 
1,U [BJ. By the semantic clause for quantification, this is the case iff the sets 
given by (121) and (122) are in the relation J( Q) and moreover M f= 1,U [A]. 
{ d I [7r1]M(A[x := d]) 'I 0} 
{d I [7r1; 7Tz]M(A[x := d]) 'I 0} 
(121) 
(122) 
By the induction hypothesis and the semantic rule for ; , this is the case iff the 
sets given by (123) and (124) are in relation J( Q), and moreover M f= 7/J [A]. 
{ d I M F wep(7T1, T) [A]} 
{d IM f= wep(1q,wep(7T2, T)) [A]} 
By the semantic properties of Q, this in tum is the case iff (125). 
M f= Qx(wep(7T1, T), wep( 7Tl, wep( 7r2, T))) /\ 7/J. 
(123) 
(124) 
(125) 
Thus, the weakest existential precondition of Qw x ( 7TJ, n2) and 1,U is 
Qx( wep( 7TI, T), wep( 7TJ, wep ( n2, T))) /\ 1,U. 
This completes the proof that the definitions of wep and wup are indeed 
adequate, in other words we have established the following. 
LEMMA 4 (wep/wup adequacy). For all M E !C, all states A for M, all 
'ljJ E L, and all 7T E DAL: 
M f= wup( n, \b) [A] iff it holds for all B E [n]M (A) that M f= 1,U [ B]. 
M f= wep(n,7/J) [A] iffthere is a BE [n]M(A) with M f= 7jJ [BJ. 
Next, we show that for all 7T E DAL and for all 7/J E L we have that 
IC f- {wep( 7T, 'l/J)) 7r \ 'l/J) and lC f- { wup( n, 'lj;)} 7T { 7/J }. Again, we proceed 
by way of an induction argument. 
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Atomic Test Programs 
We only prove the result for the case of R( ti · · · tn), the other atomic cases 
being similar. Assume JC I= (wep(R(t,1 · · · tn),?jJ)) R(ti · · · tn) (7/1). By the 
definitionofwep this is equivalentto K f= (R(t1 · · · tn)/\?jJ) R(t1 · · · tn) (1};). 
By the existential test axiom, (126). 
(126) 
For the universal case, assume (127). 
(127) 
By the definition ofwup, (127) is equivalent to (128). 
K, F {R(l1···ln)--+1}J} R(t1 · · · ln) {1}; } .. (128) 
By one of the test axioms, (129). 
(129) 
Composition 
Assume K f= (wep(1ri; 7r2, 7/J)) 1q; 7r2 ('i/J). By the definition of wep, this is 
equivalent to K f= (wep(7r1,wep(7r2,7/J))) K1; 7r2 (1};). By the wep adequacy 
lemma, (130) and ( 131). 
JC F (wep(7r1, wep(7r2, 7/J))) 7rI (wep(7r2, 7/!)). 
/( F (wep(7r2, 7/1)) 7T2 (·~1). 
By the induction hypothesis, (130) and (131) yield (132) and (133). 
JC f- ( wep ( 7r1, wep ( 7r2, 1jJ))) 7rJ ( wep ( 7T2, 'lj!)). 
/( f- ( wep ( 1f2, 1}J)) 7r2 ( 1}J) · 
(130) 
(131) 
(132) 
(133) 
Applying the existential composition rule to (132) and (133) gives (134). 
(134) 
The reasoning for universal a<;sertions about weakest universal preconditions 
of programs of the fonn K1; K2 is similar. 
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Negation 
Assume .K: I= (wep(-i7f, 'lj!)) -i7f ( 7jJ ). By the definition of wep, this is equiva-
lent to .K: I= (wup(7r, .l) /\ 'ljJ) -i7f ('I/!). By the wup adequacy lemma, (135) 
.K: I= {wup(7r, _!_)} 7f {.l}. 
By the induction hypothesis, ( 135) yields ( 136) . 
.K: I- { wup( 7f, .l)} 7f { J_ }. 
An application of one of the negation rules to (136) gives (137). 
(135) 
(136) 
(137) 
The reasoning for universal assertions about weakest universal preconditions 
for programs of the fonn -i7f is similar. 
Implication 
Assume .K: I= (wep(7r1 ::::} 7rz,'l/!)) 7f1 ::::} 7r2 (~;).By the definition of wep, 
this is equivalent to .K: I= ( ( wup( 7f, wep( 7r2, T)) /\ 7jJ)) 7fJ ::::} 71"2 ('I);). By the 
wup and wep adequacy lemma, (138) and (139) . 
.K: I= {wup(7r1,wep(n2, T))} 7rJ {wep(n2, T)}. 
.K: I= (wep(n2, T)) 7rz (T). 
By the induction hypothesis, (138) yields (140) and (139) yields (141) . 
.K: I- {wup(7r1,wep(7r2, T))} 7TJ {wep(7r2, T)}. 
.K: I- (wep( 7r2, T)) 71"2 (T). 
Now apply the first rule of implication to (140), (141): 
.K: I- {wup(n1,wep(7r2, T))} 71"1::::} n2 {'lji}. 
(138) 
(139) 
(140) 
(141) 
(142) 
The reasoning for universal assertions about weakest universal preconditions 
for programs of the form n1 ::::} 7r2 is similar. 
1J Assignment 
Assume .K: I= (wep(77x : n, 'lji)) 17x : n ('I/!). By the definition of wep this is 
equivalent to .K: I= (:Jxwep(7r, 1/J)) 1):-C: n (1/J). By the wep adequacy lemma, 
(143) . 
.K: I= (wep(n,'lji)) 7r (1/J). (143) 
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By the induction hypothesis, (143) yields (144). 
K I- ( wep ( 7T, 'ljJ)) 7T ( 'ljJ). ( 144) 
An application of the existential rJ assignment rule to (144) gives (145). 
K I- (3xwep(7r,'1/J)) TJX: 7r ('1/J). (145) 
The reasoning for universal assertions about weakest universal preconditions 
for programs of the fonn 'IJX : ?r is similar. 
i Assignment and Quantification 
Left to the reader. 
We have now established the following lemma. 
LEMMA 5 (wep/wup derivability). For all ?T E DAL and for all 'lj; E L, 
K I- (wep(7r, '1/J)) ?r ('1/J) and K I- {wup(7r, '1/J)} 1T {'1/J }. 
The rest of the proof of the completeness result is very easy. We want to show 
that K f= F implies K I- F. In case F equals <.p for some <.p E L, K f= <.p 
implies K I- <.p by the K oracle rule. For the case where F equals (<p) 1T ('1/J) 
the reasoning is as follows. Assume (146). 
K F ('P) 1T ('1/J). (146) 
By the wep adequacy lemma it follows from (146) that (147). 
K f= <p-+ wep(?r, '1/J). (147) 
From this, by the K, oracle rule, ( 148). 
K I- 'P -+ wep ( 1T, 'ljJ). (148) 
From the wep/wup derivability lemma we have (149). 
K I- ( wep ( 1T, 'ljJ)) 7T ( 'ljJ). (149) 
From (148) and (149) by an application of the existential consequence rule, 
(150). 
K I- (cp) 7r ('1/J). (150) 
By similar reasoning we derive from (151) that (152). 
K F {<p} 7r {'1/J}. 
K I- {<p} 7r {'1/J}. 
This completes the proof of the final result of this section. 
THEOREM 6 (Completeness). If K f= F then K I- F. 
(151) 
(152) 
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10. USE OF THE CALCULUS 
The discussion of weakest preconditions in Section 9 will have made clear 
that the rules of the calculus are given in a format particularly suited to the 
calculation of weakest universal and existential preconditions. To find the 
weakest existential precondition of a program 7r and a formula '1/J, proceed as 
follows. Start with the conclusion (?) 7r (T), and apply the rules of the cal-
culus working backwards, thus decomposing n. This will eventually produce 
a fonnula l.f! to fill the ? slot. Thus, as explained in Section 7, the calculus 
allows us to calculate the static meanings of (the DAL translations of) natural 
language example sentences. As a first example, we calculate the static mean-
ing of the conditional donkey sentence given in (5), with DAL translation (7), 
which is repeated here for convenience. 
(rix: Gx; 'l/Y: By; Hxy) => Txy. 
We want to find the weakest precondition <p such that (154). 
(<p) (71x: Gx; TlY: By; Hxy) => Txy (T). 
(153) 
(154) 
According to the existential rule for implication, the formula <p we are looking 
for is the weakest formula for which we can find a 'ljJ satisfying the following: 
{<p} 71x: Gx; TlY: By; Hxy {'1/J} ('1/J) Txy (T) 
(l.f!) (rix: Gx; 'l/Y: By; Hxy) => Txy (T). 
To find c.p in terms of 'ljJ, look for a x satisfying the following: 
{cp} r7x: Gx; r/Y: By {x} {x} Hxy {'1/J} 
{<p} 7JX: Gx; 'lJY: By {'1/J}. 
Now we can compute <pin terms of x, as follows: 
{Gx-+ Vy(By-+ x)} Gx {Vy(By-+ x)} {By-+ x} By {x} 
{Vx(Gx-+ Vy(By-+ x))} 1)X: Gx{Vy(By-+ x)} {Vy(By-+ x)} 1JY: By {x} 
{Vx(Gx-+ Vy( By-+ x))} 1JX: Gx; 1/Y: By {x}. 
To find x in tenns of '1/J, apply the universal axiom for atomic tests (155). 
{Hxy -t '1/J} Hxy {'I/;}. (155) 
Finally, to find '1/J, we apply the existential axiom for atomic tests (156). 
(Txy) Txy (T). (156) 
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Combining these results we find the end result of the whole computation 
(157). 
Vx(Gx __, Vy(By __, (Hxy __,. Txy))). (157) 
From the fact that the procedure calculates the weakest precondition under 
which (153) can succeed it follows that (157) is the static meaning of this 
program. 
Next we show that::::} can be defined in terms of; and-,, by deriving two 
rules for•( 7r!; -i7r2) which are identical to the rules for dynamic implication. 
To derive the first rule of implication, assume (158) and (159). 
{ lp} 7rJ {'If!}. 
('1/J) 7r2 (T). 
(158) 
(159) 
Using the two negation rules and the universal rule of sequential composition, 
we get the following derivation. 
('If!) n2 (T) 
{'If!} '7r2 { J_} 
This gives the following derived rule: 
{ lp} 7rJ {'If!} (1/J) n2 (T) 
For the second rule of implication, start with (160) and (161). 
(tp) 7rJ ('If!). 
{ 'ljJ } 1l'2 { J_ } . 
(160) 
(161) 
Applying the two rules of negation and the existential rule of sequential 
composition now gives the following derivation. 
{ 'lj;} 7r2 { J_} 
( 'ljJ) •n2 (T) 
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This gives the following derived rule: 
{ '1,b } 7r2 { l..} 
{IP v x} -i(n1; -in2) {x}. 
Next, we derive the static meaning of (38) (under its weak reading), the 
translation of which is repeated here for convenience. 
mostw v1(Gv1; ryv2: Bv2; Hv1v2,Tv1v2). 
We want to find the weakest precondition <p for which (163). 
(cp) mostw v1(Gv1; 'f/V2: Bv2; HvIV2, Tv1v2) (T). 
(162) 
(163) 
By the first quantifier rule, we know that IP equals mostw VI ( 'ljJ, x), where 7./J 
and x satisfy (164), (165), (166), and (167). 
('lj;) Gv1; rtV2: Bv2; Hv1v2 (T). 
{-.7./J} Gv1; 'r/V2: Bv2; HvIV2 {J_}. 
(x) Gv1; ryv2 : Bv2; H VI v2; Tv1 v2 (T) 
{-.x} Gv1; 'f/Vz : Bv2; HvI v2; TvI v2 { l.. }. 
(164) 
(165) 
(166) 
(167) 
Note that (165) and (167) are only there to guarantee that '1jJ and x are 
weakest existential preconditions of the given programs with respect to T. 
The quantifier rule says that the rule in this case would still hold if we omit 
(167) (by virtue of the fact that most is MONj), but of course then there is 
no guarantee anymore that most VI ( 'ljJ, x) expresses the weakest existential 
precondition of (162) with respect to T. However, if we take care not to 
use the consequence rules we calculate weakest preconditions anyway, so 
then we can omit (165) and (167) and still arrive at the weakest existential 
precondition of ( 162) with respect to T. 
To calculate the value of 'ljJ, according to the existential rule of sequential 
composition we have to find a 7./J' satisfying the following: 
(7/J') HvIV2 (T) 
(7./J) GvI; rtv2: Bv2; Hv1v2 (T). 
The following derivation gives us the value for 7./J in terms of 'ljJ'. 
(BV7. /\ 1/;1) B112 (1/;1) 
(Gv1 /\ 3v:i(BV2 /\ '1/J')) Gv1 (3t12{B112 /\ '1/J')) (3V2.(Bv:i /\ '1/J1 )) 'IJV2: BV2 (1/;') 
(Gv1 /\3vi(Bvi /\1/;1)) Gv1; 1Jt12: BV2 ('1/J'). 
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The existential axiom for atomic tests yields that 'l/J' has the value H v1 v2, so 
the outcome of the whole computation of 'ljJ is given in (168). 
A similar derivation gives the value for x: 
Gv1/\3vz(Bvz /\ Hv1vz /\ Tv1vz)). 
Thus, we arrive at the following static meaning for (162): 
most v1(Gv1/\3vz(Bvz /\ Hv1vz), 
Gv1 /\ 3vz(Bvz /\ Hv1vz /\ Tvivz)). 
(168) 
(169) 
(170) 
One final remark on the fact that our calculus is geared to finding precondi-
tions, given a program and an output condition. We hope to have demonstrated 
the usefulness of this in the above examples. However, one might also be in-
terested in calculating postconditions (which of course is possible with the 
calculus). It is straightforward to check the following. For a program 7r which 
is a test, calculating the weakest existential precondition of 7r with respect to 
T is equivalent to calculating the strongest universal postcondition of 7r with 
respect to T. For programs which are not tests, this equivalence breaks down, 
but in such cases there is a different reason for being interested in postcondi-
tions. The strongest universal postcondition with respect to T of a program 
7T which is not a test will have free occurrences of precisely those variables 
that are available for external dynamic binding in programs 7T1 following 7r. 
11. DYNAMIC LOGIC AND (NON) MONOTONICITY 
It is possible to characterize the difference between the languages DAL and 
DALo in terms of the axioms of our calculus, by adding the following rule to 
the calculus to make it applicable to DALo programs. 
Monotonicity Rule 
{ <p} 7rJ { 7,b} 
{ <p} 1ri; 7rz { 1/! }, provided fv( <p) = 0. 
This rule can be proved sound by induction on the complexity of 7rz. In the 
basic case 7rz has the form of a basic test, let us say 7rz equals R( t1 · · · tn). Then 
certainly one can safely conclude from { <p} 7r1 { 1/J} to { <p} 7r1; R( t1 · · · tn) { 1/! }, 
because of the fact that R( t 1 • · · tn) is a test and the fact that the conclusion 
is a conditional statement. 
42 JAN VAN EIJCK AND FER-JAN DE VRIES 
In the induction step, all DALo constructs which form test programs pose 
no difficulty, again because of the fact that the conclusion of the Monotonicity 
Rule is a conditional statement. Thus, the only programming constructs that 
could cause trouble are sequential composition and 'fl and l assignment. 
Assume that 7rz has the form 7r1; n 11 • Then we can use the induction hypoth-
esis to conclude from { <p} n1 {'I/;} to { <p} 7rl; n1 { 'lj.J }, and use the induction 
hypothesis again to conclude from this to { <p} n 1; n'; 7r11 { 1jJ}. 
Assume that 7r2 has the form ryx : n'. Also assume { cp} 7r1 { 'lj.J }, with 
fv ( zp) = 0. We have to show that one can safely conclude { cp} 1ri; 'f/X : 7r1 { 1jJ } . 
First observe that the induction hypothesis gives us: from { cp} 7r1 {'I/;} one 
can conclude { cp} 7rJ; 7r1 h'J }. Thus, there is some x with { cp} 7rJ {x} and 
{x} n' {'l,b}. Moreover, since fv(cp) = 0, we may assume fv(x) ~ av(7r1) 
(use a simple induction argument). Now it follows from the fact that program 
7r1; rp: : 7r1 is a DALo program that :r ~ fv(x). Thus, 3xx is equivalent 
to x. as the quantification over :r is vacuous. Thus we can conclude from 
{zp} 7r1 {x} to {zp} 7r1 {:Jxx}. From {x} 7r1 {'lj;}, derive with the universal 
rule for T/ assignment that {3xx} 7r1 { 1jJ }. Then the universal composition 
rule allows us to conclude that { cp} 7rJ; T}X7r1 { 'lj.J }. The reasoning for the case 
of i assignment is similar. This completes the proof of the soundness of the 
Monotonicity Rule for DALo programs. 
We can use the monotonicity rule to infer from (171) that (172). 
(cp) 7r1 :::} 7rz (T). 
(cp) (7r1; 7r~):::} 7r2 (T). 
(171) 
(172) 
Conditions: the precondition formula cp should not have any free variables, 
and the programs in (171) and (172) should be DAL0 programs. 
Since M f= 7rJ :::} 7r2 [A] iff it holds that if M f= 7rJ [A] then M f= 
7rz [A], this shows thatdynamicconsequence for DALoprograms is monotonic 
(provided no program variable is used without previous assignment). It should 
be noted that all DAL translations of natural language examples in this paper 
are indeed DALo programs where no program variables are used without 
previous assignment. 
12. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have demonstrated the potential of the use of tools from pro-
gramming language semantics for the semantics of natural language. While 
r/ and i assignment can in principle be decomposed in random assignment 
with subsequent testing, we have two reasons for preferring the treatment we 
gave. In the first place, extending the treatment of definite descriptions with 
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an account of their presuppositions (which is an obvious next move in the 
framework we have presented) would make a decomposition oft, assignment 
impossible or at least very impractical. Secondly, and more importantly, t, and 
r/ assignments are to be preferred over a decomposition in terms of random 
assignment plus subsequent testing because the introduction of an individ-
ual by a definite or an indefinite noun phrase gets an exact counterpart in 
the dynamic translation language. In other words, the real merit of" and 'f/ 
assignments is that they allow faithfulness to linguistic form. 
Instead of the universal and existential Hoare-style correctness statements 
that we employed we might have used the toolkit of dynamic logic (cf. 
[Hare!, 1984: 497-604]). Replacing {cp} n {'!jJ} by c.p __, [7r]'!jJ and (cp) 7f ('!jJ) 
by i.p __, ( 7f) '!/; is all there is to such a change. Still, we prefer our notation, for 
several reasons. In the first place, it is less cluttered than the dynamic logic 
notation. Next, the full expressive power of dynamic logic is not needed for 
our purposes, so it seems wiser to choose a tool that fits the requirements more 
precisely. Finally, the static { <p} and (c.p) statements can be used as comments 
to annotate DAL programs, thus providing proof outlines for deriving the 
static meanings of programs. 
A set-up where quantifiers, negations, and implications act as tests, and 
where descriptions are virtually the only externally dynamic elements, will be 
very strict about which anaphoric links are possible. The framework as it has 
been set up above does correctly predict that the anaphoric links suggested 
by the indices in (l 73) are out. 
No boy1 owned a ea?. *Hei washed it2. (173) 
The reason for this is our assumption that quantifiers act externally as tests. 
The binary quantifier that translates no acts externally as a test, so after 
the processing of the first sentence of discourse (173) we are back with the 
initial state, and the two pronouns in the second sentence will not get proper 
referents. It is well-known, however, that relaxations are necessary to deal 
with the external dynamic effects of symmetric quantifiers and with various 
cases of so-called subordination (see for example [Roberts, 1989: 683-712] 
and [Heim, 1990: 137-177]). Our next self-imposed task is to extend and 
modify the framework to deal with such cases. 
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